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O'CONNOR ON GRATUITOUS NATURAL EVIL
William Hasker

David O'Connor has criticized my arguments for the conclusion that God's
existence is compatible with genuinely gratuitous natural evil. In this reply,
I show that his own arguments fail to achieve their objective; in addition, I
point out several respects in which he has misstated my position.

David O'Connor has criticized my arguments for the conclusion that
God's existence is compatible with genuinely gratuitous natural evil.1
Not surprisingly, I think it is his own arguments that fail to achieve their
objective. But he has raised some interesting points, and I am happy for
the opportunity to respond.
The purpose of my argument was to show, in O'Connor's words, that
"if God prevented all genuinely gratuitous natural evil, an outcome
inconsistent with God's nature or goals in world-making and worldgovernance would result, thus ... God could not prevent all genuinely
gratuitous natural evil" (p. 381).2 Evil is gratuitous if "it is such that an
omnipotent being could have prevented it without thereby having prevented the occurrence of some greater good" (p. 24, quoted by O'Connor
on p. 381). The divine objectives I allege would be frustrated if God
were to prevent all such evil include the promotion of "knowledge, prudence, courage, foresight, cooperation, and compassion"; I go on to
explain, "Because nature seems likely to harm or frustrate us in various
ways, we are motivated to gain knowledge of its workings, to take
thought to avert undesirable consequences, and the like" (pp. 38-39).3 In
order to have a single term by which to refer to such goods, I shall call
them "goods of resistance against nature," or more briefly, "goods of
resistance."
But why would these divine objectives be frustrated, if God were to
prevent all gratuitous natural evil? As O'Connor rightly observes, my
response takes different forms depending on whether or not it is
assumed that human beings know God is doing this. On the assumption
that we do know this, I wrote:
It is evident that the consequences with regard to the list of goods
noted above-knowledge, prudence, courage, foresight, cooperation, and compassion-would be rather drastic. Surely the motivaFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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tion to acquire andlor respond in accordance with any or all of
these goods would be greatly reduced, if not eliminated entirely, if
we really believed that God would prevent any natural evils which
were not essential to the realization of still greater goods. To be
sure, we might still have some inclination to avoid outcomes that
seemed especially distasteful to us personally-but such an inclination would be of questionable rationality, inasmuch as by preventing those outcomes we would also be preventing the occurrence of goods which are at least equal and possibly greater (p. 39,
quoted by O'Connor on pp. 381-82).
As O'Connor correctly observes, the situation envisaged is not one in
which no natural evil occurs, but one in which it is known that all natural evil is necessary to the occurrence of greater goods. My claim, as
restated by O'Connor, is that in such a situation, by "combatting and
counteracting the natural evil that exists ... -for instance, by alleviating
pain and suffering, and so on-we would also be preventing the occurrence of those possibly greater goods for which that natural evil is necessary" (p. 382). "In a purely logical sense," he admits, "Hasker is of
course right." Nevertheless, my claim is misleading, as he attempts to
show by an example."
The example concerns a certain Socrates, who is "suffering great pain
from a contagious illness for which neither he nor anyone else is responsible" (p. 383). Moved by sympathy for Socrates, we treat his pain and
succeed in alleviating it. By preventing Socrates' future pain, we also
(by hypothesis) prevent the occurrence of the future goods for which
that pain would be the necessary condition. So far, there is no disagreement between O'Connor and me. But he regards it as "queer" to
describe our action (as I do, by implication, in the quotation above), as
motivated by "an inclination to avoid outcomes that seemed especially
distasteful to us personally ... an inclination ... of questionable rationality, inasmuch as by preventing those outcomes we would also be preventing the occurrence of goods which are at least equal and possibly
greater." Why is this queer?
Part of the answer lies in my phrase, "avoid outcomes that seemed
especially distasteful to us personally," a locution O'Connor seems to
find annoying. Perhaps the phrase does have too egoistical a ring,
though Twould point out that various things can be very distasteful to a
person without being selfishly motivated. The point I had in mind is
simply that each of us has a circle, larger or smaller as the case may be,
of "special concerns," injury to which has a greater impact on us than a
comparable harm to something or someone with which we are not personally connected. I don't think O'Connor would disagree with this.
But O'Connor has a more serious objection: "by being moved by,
treating, and alleviating (preventing) Socrates' pain as we did and with
the motivation we had, we are instantiating precisely those greater moral
goods for which, in this case, Socrates' pain is necessary-courage (given
the known risk of contagion) compassion, prudence, and so on" (p. 383).
In short, rather than our action frustrating the achievement of the goods
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for which Socrates' suffering is necessary, we are in fact accomplishing
those very goods. And in view of this, it cannot be maintained that our
awareness that Socrates' suffering is not genuinely gratuitous undercuts
our motivation to relieve his suffering.
The answer to this seems obvious. It is true that Socrates will suffer
more if we do not help him than if we do. But, given that Socrates' suffering cannot possibly be gratuitous (though it may seem to us to be so),
the following is the case: If we allow his further suffering, some good
will come about as a result of this which is at least sufficient to outweigh
all of his sufferings-a good such that, if we were to grasp it from a
Cod's-eye point of view, we would exclaim: "So that is why he suffered!" And we would see that, all things considered, things would have
been no better, but might very possibly have been worse, had we
stepped in to relieve the suffering. And this, I believe, does indeed tend
to lessen (though perhaps not remove entirely) our inclination to relieve
Socrates' suffering.
O'Connor, however, sees the situation differently. He envisions us as
choosing between two possible worlds: WI, which will result if we
choose to help Socrates, and W2, which will result if we choose not to
help him. Apart from the considerations involved in the present discussion, we certainly ought to conclude that the best thing to do would be
to help Socrates. But by hypothesis, neither world includes any genuinely gratuitous evil. Does this fact have any bearing on our choice
between WI and W2? O'Connor thinks not; he argues that the fact in
question "is neutral between the two options" (p. 384). His reasoning is
as follows:
On the one hand there is the idea that, because we know no genuinely gratuitous natural evil will result from our not helping him
we are not obligated to help him, that we may, in good conscience,
ignore his plight. ... But, on the other hand, there is the idea that,
because we know that, if we help him, we run no risk of inadvertently causing him (or anybody else) gratuitous harm, a possible
inhibitor of our helping him is removed, namely, the fear that we
might unintentionally cause him needless suffering. In my view
the latter idea is at least as plausible as the former (pp. 384-85).
This reasoning is confused. It is true that nothing we can do or refrai1l
from doing will cause him or anyone else needless (that is, gratuitous) suffering. That fear is eliminated no matter what we choose to do; as a consideration for choosing between WI and W2, it cancels out. There is, on
the other hand, the very real possibility that, if we intervene, we will
thereby prevent the occurrence of a greater good, one which more than
outweighs the extra suffering Socrates will endure in W2. And this consideration is not neutral as between WI and W2; what it shows is that we
have nothing (on balance) to gain by choosing WI and helping Socrates,
and very possibly something to lose. All this contrasts markedly with
what, in real-life situations, we usually assume to be the case: namely,
that by alleviating Socrates' pain we prevent a significant evil and there
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is no particular reason to suppose we will also be forfeiting some important good that would result from his continued suffering. The knowledge that neither WI nor W2 contains gratuitous evil is by no means
neutral in its effect on the choice between them. 5
O'Connor goes on to cite a number of reasons, drawn from common
morality and reinforced by theistic beliefs, why one ought to help
Socrates rather than permit him to continue suffering. Of course I agree
with this completely. But since, in spite of O'Connor's arguments, the
(supposed) knowledge that there is no genuinely gratuitous evil does
work to undermine our motivation to help Socrates, the correct conclusion to draw is that a prudent theist should not accept the assertion that
gratuitous evil does not exist.
So far, we have been assuming that we humans know, or can know,
that God prevents all gratuitous natural evil. But I also consider the possibility that God prevents all such evil, but we humans do not and cannot know this. My main point in this discussion is that there is simply
no feasible way God could do this, consistent with his own nature and
creative purposes. A key point, never really addressed by O'Connor, is
that the prevention of all gratuitous evil is supposed to follow from the
essential nature of God; because God is morally perfect, such evil cannot
be permitted. But clearly it is an important part of God's creative purposes that his rational creatures should come to know what God is like.
And, by hypothesis, he cannot achieve this purpose without our also
coming to know that he prevents all gratuitous evil. This in itself is sufficient to show that the conjunction, God prevents all gratuitous evil but
we humans are permanently unaware of that fact, is not viable. 6
I do also suggest that, in order to prevent gratuitous natural evil without our knowing it, God would have to engage in massive deception.
(Perhaps he could secretly anesthetize humans and animals who are
dying in apparent agony, while leaving their behavior such as to suggest
great suffering.) In saying this, I had in mind worlds substantially like
our own with respect to the natural evils (including apparently gratuitous natural evils) they contain. O'Connor claims, however, that God
could create a world (which he calls W4) in which he "pre-emptively prevents" gratuitous natural evils. In such a world there would be no gratuitous natural evil to begin with, and thus no need for God to act ''behind
our backs," so to speak, in eliminating it. Yet, according to O'Connor,
there is no reason why we, the inhabitants of W4, would suppose God
was preventing all gratuitous natural evil: in that world, "things being
the way they are would be perfectly natural to us" (p. 388).
I must confess I have difficulty understanding how this is supposed
to work. According to O'Connor W4, though it contains no genuinely
gratuitous natural evil, "does contain the same amount, variety and distribution of both moral evil and ostensibly gratuitous natural evil as ...
the actual world." But this is an impossibility: genuinely gratuitous evil
is ostensibly gratuitous evil (see p. 34), so to pre-emptively prevent the
genuinely gratuitous natural evil is ipso facto to prevent a good deal of
the ostensibly gratuitous natural eviP But however this may be,
O'Connor's argument cannot succeed. For as we have already seen, the
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denizens of W4 would corne to recognize that God prevents all genuinely
gratuitous evil as soon as they carne to a true apprehension of God's
nature, which by hypothesis is incompatible with his permitting gratuitous evil to occur.
There remains O'Connor's "final thought." Many reflective theists
have concluded that the existence of genuinely gratuitous evil is incompatible with God's existence, and thus that the actual world cannot contain such evil. But these theists are "not robbed of motivation to acquire,
or respond in accordance with, moral goods" (p. 387). In view of this,
O'Connor asks "whether it is an intended consequence of [my] position
that theists' moral motivation rests on a mistake?"
A good question! The view I am criticizing has indeed been widely
accepted by theists, though perhaps it is not so nearly universal as
O'Connor implies. 8 But I do not think this means that the moral motivations of these theists are mistaken. The theists I know certainly are
inclined to act to relieve suffering. They do this, so far as I can tell, out
of genuine care and compassion for their fellow-humans, often supplemented by the thoughts that this is what God expects of them, that in so
doing they are imitating Christ, or even that Christ himself stands before
them in the person of the needy brother or sister. None of this strikes
me as the least bit confused or mistaken. Where they are confused, in
my view, is in accepting views concerning theodicy which, if seriously
applied in everyday moral existence, would indeed tend to undermine
their motivation for works of mercy. Usually, however, this seems not
to happen; some of the most compassionate people I know accept the
kind of theodicy I am criticizing. Perhaps the Holy Spirit is actively at
work in preventing God's people from carrying out in practice the implications of their mistaken beliefs.
But there is another side to the picture. Most often, perhaps, such
maxims as "It's all for the best," or "God wants it that way," are invoked
at a fairly late stage of an encounter with evil, after everything that
humanly can be done, has been done. Sometimes, however, these things
are said too soon: Worthwhile plans are abandoned prematurely in the
face of supposedly "providential" obstacles that could be overcome by
persistent effort, and grave illnesses are accepted as "God's will" when
there are still promising treatment options available. When these things
happen, the theoretical consequences I have pointed out in this article
become all too real in practice.
NOTES
1. David O'Connor, "Hasker on Gratuitous Natural Evil," Faith and
Philosophy 12:3 (July 1995), pp. 380-92. The article to which he is replying is
'The Necessity of Gratuitous EviL" Faith and Philosophy 9:1 (January 1992),
pp. 23-44. Page references in the test are to these two articles; when a quotation is given without a page reference it will be found on the page most
recently referenced.
2. O'Connor is in error, however, in asserting that I claim that the quoted proposition is logically necessary-that "in any possible world W, if God
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prevented all genuinely gratuitous natural evil. .. etc." In my article, I state
explicitly that my conclusions "rest on certain very general but contingent
facts about what the world and human moral agents are like" (p. 42, note
19). (It should also be noted that O'Connor abbreviates "genuinely gratuitous natural evil" as "GGNE"; I prefer to avoid such abbreviations, and for
the sake of consistency have eliminated them also in my quotations from
him.)
3. It should be noted that these goals do not include preventing the
undermining of morality, as O'Connor states (p. 381); that is a reason for
God not to prevent all gratuitous moral evil, but I do not invoke it with
respect to natural evil. Furthermore, the distinction between genuinely gratuitous evil and ostensibly gratuitous evil applies only to moral evil. In general, O'Connor assimilates my discussion of gratuitous natural evil too
closely to the previous discussion of gratuitous moral evil. I will do my best
to correct for this distortion in expounding O'Connor's position.
4. But shouldn't we be put on our guard when, in what is after all a logical discussion, we are told that someone is right "in a purely logical sense"
but wrong in some other, presumably more profound, sense?
5. In the very same issue of Faith and Philosophy that contains O'Connor's
article, my argument receives welcome support from Christopher Hughes.
Hughes is discussing Thomas Aquinas' doctrine that (in the words of
Eleonore Stump) "God won't allow an evil to befall a saint unless in the long
run and on balance things will be at least as good for that saint as they would
have been had that evil not occurred." Hughes pictures Thomas standing
beside a sleeping Francis of Assisi, who is apparently about to receive a
painful injury from a heavy object that is coming loose from the ceiling.
According to Hughes, "It seems clear that--even if St. Thomas is convinced
of the sanctity of St. Francis-he should prevent the object from hitting St.
Francis (say, by pushing him out of the way). It would be wrong for St.
Thomas to do nothing. But it is unclear why, on St. Thomas' own principles,
this should be so. For it is unclear that, on St. Thomas' principles, St. Francis
is in any danger of being harmed. After all, St. Thomas believes that God
allows only beneficial suffering to afflict the saints. Why couldn't he conclude St. Francis is in no danger of being harmed, on the grounds that God
will allow the falling object to hit St. Francis if but only if the suffering it
causes St. Francis is beneficial to him?" (Review of Eleonore Stump, ed.
Reasoned Faith, in Faith and Philosophy 12:3 (July 1995), pp. 426-31).
6. William Wainwright makes the following suggestion: "I would have
thought that God's essential nature entails all sorts of things that (because of
God's transcendence and our epistemic limitations) 'we do not and cannot
know.' Yet this is presumably compatible with God's desire that we 'should
come to know what God is like.'" Undoubtedly, we cannot fully grasp
God's essence. It does not seem very plausible, though, that this inability
would extend to God's (supposed) property of being essentially incapable of
permitting gratuitous natural evil in his universe. After all, quite a few people suppose that, as things now stand, they discern this to be an essential
property of God. But suppose Wainwright is correct, and our epistemic limitations render us incapable of knowing whether or not this is an essential
property of God. In that case, it becomes impossible for anyone to construct
a problem of evil based on gratuitous natural evil, and the rest of this discussion is unnecessary.
7. As has already been noted, the distinction I draw between ostensibly
gratuitous evil and genuinely gratuitous evil applies properly to moral evil,
not to natural evil. No doubt a comparable distinction could be worked out
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for natural evil, but I will not pursue that project here.
8. Among theodicists who reject it may be mentioned Michael Peterson
(Evil and the Christian God, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1982), and John Hick. For a
clear statement of Hick's view on this, consider the following: "The Irenaean
theodicy does not suggest that each individual evil event serves a specific
good purpose, or is transformed into a specific good, but that each individual event, evil as well as good, is a contingent part of the actual history of
the universe; and that this history as a totality is leading ultimately to the
limitless and all-justifying good of eternal life in God's presence"
("Response to Mesle," in C. Robert Mesle, John Hick's Theodicy: A Process
Humanist Critique, New York: St. Martin's, 1991), p. 131).

